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ELECTIONS IN THE STATE OF MISSOURI
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PROPORTIONAL REPRE-
SENTATION AS APPLIED TO ELECTIONS IN THE
STATE OF MISSOURI
E. M. GROSSMAN and F. WARNER FISCHER
The question to be discussed herein is whether it would be pos-
sible under the present constitution of Missouri to change the
method of electing certain representative bodies so as to put into
effect the system of proportional representation known as the
Hare System, or some other plan accomplishing in essentials the
results which the Hare system is designed to effectuate.
Proportional representation may be defined as any plan of
selecting the members of a representative body in such a way as
to enable each political party or other more or less like-minded
group of any considerable size to elect a number of members
bearing approximately the same ratio to the total membership of
the body as the votes cast by such group bear to the total votes
cast. Proportional representation is offered by its advocates
as an improvement on the plurality system of voting which at the
present time prevails in the election of most representative
political bodies in the United States, under which the members
of the body are either elected at large, in which case a majority
of the electorate elects all the representatives and the minority,
no matter how large, is unrepresented, or else they are elected
by geographical districts, in which case the majority of the voters
resident in any one district casts the only effective vote for the
representative or representatives from that district. Propor-
tional representation is designed not only to give minorities rep-
resentation in proportion to their voting strength, but also to
prevent a majority or plurality being denied its due share of
representation as it frequently is under the geographical voting
district method, when a majority or plurality of the whole
electorate is so distributed that it does not have a plurality of
the votes in a majority or plurality of the districts. Under the
schemes of proportional representation most in use, geographical
divisions of the electorate are not entirely abolished, but there
are relatively few such geographical divisions, the number of
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representatives to be elected from each is relatively large, and
within each district the principle of proportional representation
is observed.
The Hare System is a particular method of securing propor-
tional representation which is generally favored by the pro-
ponents of proportional representation in this country as per-
haps the most nearly perfect practicable scheme which has yet
been devised. It combines with the principle of proportional
representation the idea of the preferential ballot and makes it
possible, without undue inconvenience, not only for each political
party of any considerable size to receive its proportional share of
representation, but also for the individual voter to express his
preferences between different candidates of the same party, or
among all the candidates regardless of party and for the voters
to group themselves automatically according to their real prefer-
ences without being limited to groupings according to organized
political parties.
An adequate appreciation of the issues involved in a consider-
ation of the constitutionality of the Hare System can hardly be
gained without a more detailed knowledge of the workings of
the Hare System than can be given in the space here available.
However, the essential features of the plan may perhaps be sum-
marized as follows: Whereas, under the plurality system of vot-
ing, the voter votes for as many candidates as there are represen-
tatives to be selected, if the voting is at large, or for as many
candidates as there are representatives allotted to his district, if
the voting is by districts, and each vote is of equal effect, under
the Hare System the voter may vote for as many or as few candi-
dates as he pleases, but in a serial order of preference, indicating
a single first choice, a single second choice, and so on for as many
choices as he desires to express. He is given to understand that
his vote will help elect his first choice if there are sufficient other
votes for that candidate to elect him, but will be counted for his
second choice if it cannot help elect his first choice, and so on
down the line. Any candidate is deemed entitled to a seat on
the body to be elected if his vote equals or exceeds a certain
"quota", calculated by dividing the total number of valid votes
cast by the number of places to be filled, plus one, and taking
the next largest whole number. This quota is (or purports to
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be) ' the smallest possible number of votes which might be re-
ceived by each of as many candidates as there are places to be
filled, without leaving enough other votes to give an equal or
greater vote to any other candidate. All candidates who receive
at least a quota of first-choice votes are first declared elected. If
a candidate receives more than a quota, his surplus votes are dis-
tributed, or transferred, in accordance with the indicated second
choices, among candidates having less than a quota, until the
total of first and second choice votes for such candidates amounts
to a quota. If the candidate indicated as second choice on a
particular ballot which is to be transferred has already received
a quota of votes, that ballot is transferred to the candidate indi-
cated as third choice, or to the one highest in order of preference
who has not yet received a quota. If the places are not all filled
by the vote for candidates who receive a quota of first choice bal-
lots, together with the transference of surplus ballots of candi-
dates who have received more than a quota, then the candidates
who have not yet received a quota are eliminated, one by one, be-
ginning with the one with the smallest number of first choice
votes, and their ballots distributed among the remaining un-
elected candidates according to the indicated second or subse-
quent choices in the same manner as surplus ballots are dis-
tributed, until as many candidates have received a quota of first
choice and transferred votes combined, as there are places to be
filled, or until the successive eliminations have left no more than
enough candidates to fill all the positions. For a more detailed
explanation of the Hare System, reference may be had to the
cases of Wattles ex rel. Johnson v. Upjohn and Reutener v. City
of Cleveland, et al., infra, or to the publications of the Propor-
tional Representation League. 2 Various modifications of the
Hare System have been devised, but for present purposes the
main features of the scheme may be taken to be as above out-
lined, except where attention is called in the course of this dis-
cussion to specific modifications thereof.
ICertain refinements on this method of calculating the quota have been
devised, but the method above described is sufficiently accurate for ordinary
purposes. See Hoag & Hallett, Proportional Representation (1926) pp.
378 ff.
2 For a still more complete exposition of the Hare system and of propor-
tional representation in general, see Hoag & Hallett, op. cit. supra, n. 1.
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As there can obviously be no such thing as proportional repre-
sentation in the case of a single official, the only officers in Mis-
souri in whose election the use of the Hare System might reason-
ably be suggested are members of (a) the State legislature, (b)
the legislative bodies of municipalities, and (c) local school
boards or boards of education.3 None of these bodies is now
elected by the Hare System or any other plan of proportional
representation. In considering whether the Hare System, with
or without modifications, could be made applicable to the election
of any of these representative bodies without amending the Con-
stitution of Missouri, it is necessary to classify the bodies accord-
ing to whether the provisions regulating their election are found
in the Constitution, the statutes or elsewhere. The classification
is as follows:
(I) The State legislature or General Assembly of the State of
Missouri is in a class by itself, since it derives its existence di-
rectly from the State Constitution, which specifically provides
how its members shall be elected.4 The Constitution prescribes
that members of the upper house shall be elected by single
member districts, which of course excludes the possibility of
proportional representation without constitutional change.
Members of the lower house are required to be elected by single
member districts, except in certain cases, where the number of
representatives from any one district may in no case exceed four.
There seems to be nothing in this particular portion of the Con-
stitution which would preclude the legislature from prescribing
the Hare System for elections within these multiple-member
districts, but since only a very remote approximation to propor-
tional representation could be achieved where there are only two,
three or four representatives to be elected by a particular body of
voters, and since it is questionable whether proportional repre-
sentation would be of much value unless extended to the whole
legislative body, or at least to the whole of one house thereof, the
idea of the adoption of the Hare System limited to the multiple-
member districts may be dismissed from consideration. It may
3 The Hare system might conceivably be applied to the selection of presi-
dential electors and representatives in Congress from Missouri, but since
these offices derive their existence from the Federal Constitution and not from
the State, they are not within the scope of this discussion.
4 Art. IV, Secs. 2, 3, 5, 6.
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therefore be said, for all practical purposes, that to apply the
principle of proportional representation in any form to the elec-
tion of the members of either or both houses of the Missouri legis-
lature, it would be necessary to amend those sections of the Con-
stitution which provide for the organization of that body and
the election of its members.
(11) Section 16 of Article IX of the Constitution of Missouri
authorizes cities of more than one hundred thousand inhabitants
to adopt charters for their own government, "consistent with and
subject to the Constitution and laws of the State". Section 17
provides for the amendment of such charters without specifically
repeating the words "consistent with and subject to the Constitu-
tion and laws of the State"; but it must undoubtedly be presumed
that no provision could be inserted in a municipal charter by way
of amendment which it would not be lawful to include in an
original charter. Separate provision is made by sections 20 to 26,
inclusive, of this Article, for the adoption and amendment of a
charter by the City of St. Louis, but the same provision with re-
spect to consistency with the Constitution and laws as is found
in section 16, is three times repeated in the sections applicable to
St. Louis.5 It therefore follows that to determine whether
chartered cities, including St. Louis, have the right, in the exer-
cise of their home-rule privileges, to adopt proportional repre-
sentation in the election of their governing bodies, it is necessary
to inquire whether there is anything which expressly or impliedly
forbids it, first, in the Constitution, or, second, in the laws of the
State applicable to such cities.
(III) Cities other than those referred to in the preceding para-
graph are not specifically mentioned in the Constitution, and they
derive their form of government solely from acts of the legis-
lature, which prescribe how the governing body of each class of
city shall be elected. Local boards of education likewise are not
mentioned by the Constitution and derive their existence directly
from legislation. With respect to these two classes of bodies it
may be said that the introduction of proportional representation
could be accomplished by changes in the pertinent statutory
law, unless there is some constitutional provision of general ap-
plication which expressly or impliedly prohibits it.
5 Sees. 20, 22 and 23.
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Since it is beyond the scope of this discussion to suggest the
specific changes in the statutory law which would be necessary
to authorize the use of the Hare System in the election of par-
ticular bodies, it is apparent from the foregoing analysis that
the chief subject of inquiry in the remainder of this discussion
must be whether there is any provision of a general nature in the
Constitution of Missouri,-for example, in the article entitled
"Suffrage and Elections" 6-which expressly or impliedly author-
izes or prohibits the introduction of the Hare or a similar system
of proportional representation in the election of such bodies as
municipal boards of aldermen or city councils, and local boards
of education. There are no provisions of the Constitution which
either authorize or prohibit, by express language, or by obvious
implication, the adoption of a plan of proportional representa-
tion anywhere in the State. It is therefore necessary to inquire
whether there are any provisions which, though not in terms di-
rected against proportional representation, might be expected to
be construed by the courts as impliedly prohibiting the Hare Sys-
tem, because inconsistent with some of its essential features.
In considering this question it will be most helpful to begin with
an examination of what the courts of other states have said with
respect to the constitutionality of the Hare system, and of other
systems of voting which have something in common with it. It
must be remembered, however, that the constitution of each state
is unique, and that precedents from other states are valuable for
present purposes only insofar as the constitutional provisions re-
lied on therein as authorizing or prohibiting proportional repre-
sentation resemble provisions which are found in the constitu-
tion of Missouri. It must further be borne in mind that the
courts of Missouri are not bound to follow the precedents exist-
ing in other states, even when based on constitutional provisions
identical with the relevant provisions of the Missouri constitu-
tion, but are at liberty to construe the organic law of their own
state in accordance with their own judgment as to the meaning
of its provisions.
There are only four reported cases in the United States passing
on the question of the validity of the Hare system under the con-
stitutions of the respective states in which the cases arose, and
6 Art. VIII.
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there are no cases on other systems of proportional representa-
tion, properly so-called. There are, however, a few decisions in-
volving the validity of various devices for securing minority
representation, though not actually proportional representation,
on elective bodies, and there are a few cases on the constitution-
ality of preferential voting, which is one of the features incorpor-
ated in the Hare system. Cases of all these classes will be found
to have some degree of relevancy in showing in general what sort
of tests have been applied by the courts in determining the ques-
tion of the constitutionality of departures from the traditional
system of plurality voting.
Of the four decisions passing directly on the constitutionality
of the Hare system, two were against its validity and two in favor
of it. The adverse decisions were rendered in the Michigan case
of Wattles ex rel. Johnson v. Upjohn and in the California case
of People ex rel. Devine v. Elkus et al.8 The favorable decisions
were rendered in the Ohio cases of Reutener v. City of Cleveland
et al.9 and Hile v. City of Cleveland.10 Both these Ohio decisions
were rendered by the same court, at the same time, and on the
same facts, the only difference being in the grounds on which the
charter amendment embodying the Hare system was attacked.
Many passages could be pointed out in the decisions adverse
to the constitutionality of the Hare system which are open to
severe criticism as being poorly reasoned or wholly irrelevant to
the decision of the legal questions involved. But it will be more
to the point, in the present inquiry, to ignore these incidental
matters and to give attention only to the essential grounds on
which the respective decisions seem to be based, with the object
of determining to what extent the same arguments are applicable
under the constitutional provisions of Missouri.
For this purpose it will not be necessary or useful to state the
facts in the respective cases, other than to say that in each the
court passed on the constitutionality of a city charter or amend-
ment thereto providing for the election of the city council or com-
missioners by the Hare system (without party lists), with no
7 (1920) 211 Mich. 514, 179 N. W. 335.
(1922) 59 Cal. App. 396, 211 Pac. 34, (hearing denied by California' Su-
preme Court).
9 (1923) 107 Ohio St. 117, 141 N. E. 27.
10 (1923) 107 Ohio St. 144, 141 N. E. 35.
Washington University Open Scholarship
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
peculiar modifications which appeared to have any bearing on the
validity of the system, except that the provision for "divided
ballots" 11 which is included in the most elaborate forms of the
Hare system evidently was not incorporated in the form con-
sidered in these cases.
Two provisions of the constitution of Michigan were relied on
by the court in Wattles ex rel. Johnson v. Upjohn, supra, in hold-
ing unconstitutional the Hare system as embodied in a recently
adopted charter of the city of Kalamazoo. These provisions
were, first, a clause defining the qualifications of voters and stat-
ing that "in all elections" every person possessing these qualifica-
tions "shall be an elector entitled to vote," and, second, a clause
reading, so far as material: "No city or village shall have power
to abridge the right of elective franchise, . . ."
The latter provision, the court said, "can fairly be construed to
mean in the light of established conditions and laws that the right
of each elector to exercise the franchise and the relative value of
his vote should be preserved as it existed under the Constitution
and general laws of the State".
If it is true that a provision prohibiting a municipality from
abridging the right of elective franchise means that the right of
suffrage must be preserved exactly as it has theretofore existed
in that community, then the court's conclusion was undoubtedly
correct, for it can not be denied that. any system of proportional
representation does require a change in the manner and effect
of the exercise of the franchise wherever the traditional plurality
system of voting has theretofore prevailed. But there is no pro-
vision in the Missouri constitution expressly forbidding the legis-
lature or municipalities "to abridge the right of elective fran-
chise", and the Michigan case should therefore not be regarded
as a precedent in Missouri, so far as that part of the decision is
concerned.
However, the court expressed a further ground for its decision,
based on the assumption that the clause of the Michigan constitu-
tion guaranteeing qualified electors the right to vote "in all elec-
tions" impliedly conferred the right to vote for every officer to be
21 A provision permitting a voter to indicate more than one first choice, his
vote counting as only a fraction of a vote for each candidate so indicated, and
the total of all his first choice votes, being equal to a single vote.
Q22
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elected. The court declared that under the Hare system the
voter's right to vote for every officer was abridged inasmuch as
that system permitted him to vote for only one first choice in the
election of a body to which a number of men were to be elected,
though the voter could indicate as many successive single choices
as he pleased. In the words of the court:
Under the Kalamazoo charter seven commissioners were
to be elected at large. Each elector had the right to vote for
seven candidates, by a vote not only "of equal effect with,
and no more than, the vote of every other elector for every
officer to be elected," but of equal potential value as to each
of the seven candidates he voted for. As construed in the
Maynard Case, the Constitution gave him the right to ex-
press his choice by a ballot vote for each of the seven commis-
sioners to be elected; and having done so, he "exhausted his
privilege." The Hare system limits his power to express his
preference "in this manner" to but one candidate of the sev-
en, only permitting him to express a second choice for one
other, and so on by numerically dwindling and weakening
choices until the elector has expressed thus "as many choices
as you (he) please." As said in the Maynard Case, "it is not
in the power of the legislature (nor a city adopting a charter
under the home rule act) to give his preference or choice,
without conflicting with these provisions of the Constitution,
more than a single expression of opinion or choice"; and he
has the right to express that single choice as to each of the
officers to be elected in his district. While each voter can
under the Hare system vote for all candidates to express
sequential choices as provided, it is evident that his vote is
primarily and positively effective for only one candidate.
The Maynard case, referred to in the foregoing quotation, was
Maynard v. Board of Canvassers,12 which involved the constitu-
tionality of a statute providing for cumulative voting for mem-
bers of the state legislature in those districts which were entitled
to more than one representative. That is, the voter was allowed
as many votes as there were representatives to be elected from
the district, and he might cast them all for one candidate or dis-
tribute them among a number of candidates in any way he saw
fit. This statute was held to be unconstitutional because it did
away with plurality voting and gave to those voters who chose
to exercise it, the right to vote more than once for a single can-
12 (1890) 84 Mich. 228, 47 N. W. 756.
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didate. The court could point to no express provision of the
Michigan constitution which prohibited a voter from casting
more than one vote for a candidate, but seemed to derive that
prohibition by implication from the provisions of the constitu-
tion guaranteeing to all qualified electors the right to vote in all
elections, and providing that all voting should be by ballot, with
certain immaterial exceptions, and, in general, from the repre-
sentative form of government provided for by the constitution.
Some of the most significant language of the court's opinion is as
follows:
The Constitution is the outgrowth of a desire of the people
for a representative form of government. The foundation of
such a system of government is, and always has been, unless
the people have otherwise signified by their constitution, that
every elector entitled to cast his ballot stands upon a complete
political equality with every other elector, and that the ma-
jority or plurality of votes for any person or measure must
prevail. All free representative government rests on this,
and there is no other way in which a free government may be
carried on and maintained. That the majority must rule,
lies at the root of the system of a republican form of govern-
ment no less than it does in a democratic. When there are
more than two candidates for the same office placed in nomi-
nation, it may often happen that one candidate, although he
may receive more votes than any other, may not receive a
majority of the votes cast. Still the principle of majority
rule is preserved, for in such case more of the electors prefer
such candidate than they do any other particular candidate
to represent them. It is the constitutional right of every
elector, in voting for any person to represent him in the Leg-
islature, to express his will by his ballot, and such vote shall
be of as much influence or weight in the result, as to any can-
didate voted for, as the ballot and vote of any other elector.
The Constitution does not contemplate, but by implication
forbids any elector to cast more than one vote for any candi-
date for any office. This prohibition is implied from the
system of representative government provided for in that in-
strument. The political history of the State from 1836 to the
present time shows that every elector has an equal voice in
the choice of those who shall represent the people in the Leg-
islature. It is implied in those provisions of the Constitution
which require that representatives in the Legislatures shall
be chosen by ballot, and by single districts. By these pro-
visions every elector expresses his wish by ballot, and a single
vote is implied. It is implied in those provisions of the Con-
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stitution that declare that every male citizen of twenty-one
years of age, and possessing the qualifications prescribed,
shall be entitled to vote at all elections; and that all votes
shall be given by ballot, except for such township officers as
may be authorized by law to be otherwise chosen.
The Court quoted the following from Bouvier's Law Diction-
ary, under the title "Vote":
One of the cardinal principles on the subject of elections
is that the person who receives a majority or plurality of the
votes is the person elected. Generally, a plurality of the
votes of the electors present is sufficient, but in some states a
majority of all the votes is required. Each elector has one
vote.
The court also remarked that no one would contend that a law
would be valid which declared that person elected who received
the least number of votes, even though there was no express con-
stitutional provision prohibiting such a law, and that this was
practically what was accomplished under the law under consider-
ation, as applied to the circumstances of the case, because, if given
effect, it would have brought about the election of a candidate
who was voted for by a minority of the voters.
It would appear that the court rendering this decision regarded
the plurality system of counting votes as inherent in the very na-
ture of an election, unless a change were brought about by a con-
stitutional amendment. In a dissenting opinion it was pointed out
that, if cumulative voting violated a fundamental principle of
republican government, as the majority opinion indicated, then
it could not be adopted even by an amendment to the state
constitution, because it would be violative of the clause of the
Constitution of the United States guaranteeing to every State a
republican form of government. But it has never been denied,
and several times has been expressely conceded, that a state may
authorize cumulative voting or other more or less similar devices
for securing minority representation, by an express constitu-
tional provision.
Attention may here be called to the case of State ex rel. v.
Constantine,13 which was relied on as a precedent in both the
Maynard and the Wattles cases, supra, and which seems to be the
first case to lay down the proposition that a constitutional pro-
13 (1884) 42 Ohio St. 437.
Washington University Open Scholarship
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
vision, setting forth the qualifications of voters, and stating that
all persons having these qualifications should be entitled to vote
"at all elections", should be construed as though it included the
words "and for every officer". In the Constantine case the court
held unconstitutional an act which, among other things, at-
tempted to provide for the election of a non-partisan, or bi-par-
tisan, board of police commissioners in certain cities, by providing
that, though four members of the board were to be elected, no
one voter might vote for more than two candidates. The court
said:
The constitution does not provide in detail the manner of
holding elections, leaving that to legislative discretion, but
it does provide that all elections shall be by ballot, and, hav-
ing prescribed the qualifications of an elector, provides that
each elector "shall be entitled to vote at all elections." [Cit-
ing section number.] By this article we have no doubt that
each elector is entitled to vote for each officer, whose elec-
tion is submitted to the electors, as well as on each question
that is submitted. This implication fairly arises from the
language of the constitution itself, but is made absolutely
certain when viewed in the light of circumstances existing
at the time of its adoption. No such thing as "minority rep-
resentation" or "cumulative voting" was known in the policy
of this state at the time of the adoption of this constitution
in 1851. The right of each elector to vote for a candidate
for each office to be filled at an election had never been
doubted. No effort was made by the framers of the consti-
tution to modify this right, and we think it was intended to
continue and guarantee such right by the provision that each
elector "shall be entitled to vote at all elections." Such right
is denied by this statute which provides for the election of
four members of the board of police commissioners, but de-
nies to any elector the right to vote for more than two per-
sons for such commissioners.
It may be noticed that in the Maynard and Constantine cases,
supra, the effect of the innovations in voting rights which it was
sought to introduce would be minority representation but not
proportional representation. In the Maynard case, in the par-
ticular instance before the court, there were only two offices to be
filled, and consequently the effect of the cumulative voting pro-
vision as it worked out in practice was to give the minority party
equal representation with the majority. However, the fact that
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proportional representation is inherently a much fairer sys-
tem than the plans of minority representation involved in the
Maynard and Constantine cases has never seemed to carry any
particular weight with the courts, so far as may be judged from
their opinions.
Before further discussing the doctrine of the foregoing cases
that the right to vote at all elections means the right to vote for
every officer to be elected, it will be well to refer to the second of
the cases holding the Hare system unconstitutional, namely, Peo-
ple ex rel. Devine v. Elkus, supra, which was decided principally
on this same ground. The constitutional provision relied on was
one providing that every qualified elector should "be entitled to
vote at all elections which are now or may hereafter be authorized
by law." The court said in part:
No one would contend that a law would be valid which
deprived a qualified elector of the right to vote at an elec-
tion. . . . The constitutional right to vote would be a barren
privilege if the Legislature could limit its exercise to one of-
fice or one proposition to be voted on. The right to vote "at
all elections" includes the right to vote for a candidate for
every office to be filled and on every proposition submitted.
The election of nine members of the city council is the elec-
tion of persons to nine offices as fully as if the offices were
distinct in name and in the duties to be discharged, and it is
as far beyond the legislative power to limit the elector to the
right of voting for one candidate therefor as it would be in
the election of state or county officers.
While the Wattles case, supra, might be rejected as a precedent
by Missouri courts, on the ground that it was based at least in part
on a constitutional provision which has no counterpart in the
Missouri constitution, the same could not be said of the Elkus
case, because in that case the decision was based squarely upon
the construction placed by such cases as those hereinabove cited
on the words "shall be entitled to vote at all elections" in a con-
stitutional provision stating the qualifications of voters. The
constitution of Missouri has a provision which, so far as concerns
the present question, is not materially different. 14
14 Art. VIII, Sec. 2: "Electors, qualifications of.-All citizens of the United
States [having certain specified qualifications] . . . and no other persons,
shall be entitled to vote at all elections by the people; . .. ."
Washington University Open Scholarship
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
That the Missouri courts would construe such a provision as
impliedly prohibiting the introduction of the Hare system of vot-
ing in municipal elections does not necessarily follow from the
fact that the courts of Michigan and California have done so.
The doctrine of the Wattles and Elkus cases is certainly open to
criticism. In the first place, it seems on the face of things to be
stretching language pretty far to say that "at all elections" is
equivalent to "for every officer". The constitutions of some
States expressly provide that persons having the qualifications
of electors shall have the right to vote in the election of all of-
ficers, and in those states a doctrine similar to that of the Con-
stantine case has greater justification. The decisions which have
been rendered in such States have all involved limited voting as
did the Constantine case.' 5
Yet there is a sense in which it is not unreasonable for a court
to say that a voter has the right to vote for every officer to be
elected, even if the constitution does not say so in so many words.
In an election in which, for example, a sheriff, a coroner and a re-
corder of deeds were to be chosen, if a statute purported to pro-
vide that a voter might vote for a candidate for any one of those
offices, but could not vote for candidates for all three, a court
would undoubtedly find some ground on which to hold the statute
void, and could hardly be criticised for doing so. The true ground
of criticism of the Constantine case, and those following it, would
seem to be that the right to vote for every officer to be elected
does not necessarily mean the right to vote for all the members
of a body such as a city council or board of aldermen, all of whom
have the same title and functions, and who act only as a group.
Where voting is by districts instead of at large, the voter does
not have the right to vote for all the members of a legislative body,
yet his constitutional rights are not regarded as infringed. 16 The
only decision which could be regarded as contrary to this proposi-
tion is State v. Wrightson,17 which proceeded on the theory that
the New Jersey constitution expressly made counties the units for
15 Opinion to the House of Representatives, (1898) 21 R. I. 579, 41 Ati.
1009, (a very brief advisory opinion); McArdle v. Jersey City, (1901) 66
N. J. L. 590, 49 Atl. 1013; State ex rel. Bowden v. Bedell, (1902) 68 N. J.
L. 451, 53 Atl. 198.
16 State ex rel. Guergin v. McAllister, (1895) 88 Tex. 284, 31 S. W. 187.
17 (1893) 56 N. J. L. 126, 28 Atl. 56.
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the election of members of the general assembly, and thereby
impliedly prohibited a division of the counties into smaller con-
stituencies by the legislature.
In calling attention to the fact that members of a legislative
body may constitutionally be elected by districts, as showing that
it is not necessary that each elector shall vote for every member
of the body, it is not intended to repeat the argument, which is
sometimes made in favor of the Hare system, that proportional
representation merely divides the voters into constituencies based
on similarity of political opinion, rather than on arbitrary geo-
graphical divisions. There are at least two differences between
the geographical constituency and the constituency under the
Hare system which make it doubtful whether much reliance can
be placed by the advocates of proportional representation on the
supposed analogy between them. In the first place, it is the very
act of voting which determines to which constituency under the
Hare system a voter belongs, whereas in the case of the geograph-
ical voting district, he belongs to a constituency predetermined by
extrinsic facts. The situation under the Hare system is some-
what, though not entirely, analogous in this respect to that which
would exist if, under the existing system the voter might vote in
any electoral district in which he chose to case his ballot, regard-
less of his residence. The second difference between the geo-
graphical voting district and the constituency under the Hare
system is that, whereas the geographical district in which a voter
resides remains fixed, at least for the duration of the election,
the constituency to which a voter would be regarded as belonging
under the Hare system would change every time his ballot is
transferred from one candidate to another. It is not insisted
that these distinctions are so vital that they completely vitiate
the effect of the argument based on the analogy between the
constituency under the Hare system and the geographical con-
stituency. Still less is it intended by these remarks to express an
opinion as to the relative merits of the constituency under the
Hare system and the geographical constituency, on general prin-
ciples. The purpose of calling attention to the differences be-
tween the two concepts is simply to make it clear that a court of
law which was not already favorably disposed toward propor-
tional representation on other grounds, could easily find reasons
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other than the mere novelty of the concept of the constituency
based on similarity of ideas for rejecting the argument that the
Hare system is merely another form of division of the electorate
into constituencies analogous to the conventional division into
geographical districts. At all events the courts have rejected this
analogy, in both the Wattles case and the Elkus case, supra, even
if they have not expressed their reasons for doing so in the most
lucid and convincing terms. In the Wattles case, the court said:
Counsel very interestingly discuss the advantages of that
theoretical method of districting constituencies by boundary
lines of opinion, belief or policy, but however alluring in
theory, such intangible, undefined theoretical demarkation
by similar thought or views is not a legal substitute for what
is in law recognized to be a voting constituency or geograph-
ically defined representative district, as the right of franchise
has become established under our Constitution.
That as a matter of fact the Hare system does actually deprive
the voter of the right to vote for all officers, in the sense meant
by the foregoing line of decisions, while it may not be exactly self-
evident, appears from reflection on the subject. Of course the
voter can vote for as many persons as he pleases, but they must,
under the Hare system as presented in all the cases in which its
constitutionality has been pased on, be voted on in a serial order
of preference, and the voter's second choice is counted only if his
ballot cannot help his first choice. Under the plurality system,
if the voter is entitled to vote for seven men, his vote for each one
will be sure to be counted, although its effectiveness in the sense
of helping to elect will depend, of course, on how many others vote
the same way. Under the Hare system there is only a remote
chance that the voter's seventh choice will be considered at all.
The advocates of the Hare system of proportional representation
may as well frankly admit that the voter's rights under that sys-
tem are materially different from what they are under the plural-
ity system, and that under the Hare system the voter does not
have the right to vote for all the officers to be elected, with the
same effectiveness as under the plurality system. It is of the
essence of the Hare system that this must be so and the use of the
term "single transferable ballot" in connection with the Hare sys-
tem is a recognition of this fact. If it is unconstitutional to intro-
duce a voting system which requires a different effect to be given
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to the individual voter's ballot from that which it has under the
conventional plurality system, then the Hare system is undoubt-
edly unconstitutional, and the only thing for the advocates of
proportional representation to do is to work for an amendment
to the constitution.
In view of the fact that the chief constitutional objection to
the Hare system has always seemed to lie in the fact that the voter
is precluded thereunder (at least as the system has been adopted
in the cities where its constitutionality has been passed on by the
courts) from voting for more than one first choice where a num-
ber of members of a board or body are to be elected, it may be
asked whether this objection cannot be overcome by the use of a
form of the Hare system which allows the voter, if he wishes, to
vote for as many first choices as there are places to be filled.
Preferential voting systems which allow the expression of as
many first choices as there are officers to be elected, have, with
the single exception of the case of Brown v. Smallwood,1 8 been
generally upheld, even when they make compulsory the voting
for as many first choices as there are offices to be filled. 19
But to give the voter the right to express as many first choices
as there are officers to be elected, while it might save the con-
stitutionality of the system, would mean the sacrifice of the
principle of proportional representation, unless it were further
provided either that those voters who wished to do so might vote
cumulatively, more than one vote for a candidate, or that those
who voted for more than one first choice should have their votes
counted only as fractional votes. Every known system of pro-
portional representation in which the voter may express as many
first choices as there are places to be filled, involves either cumu-
lative or fractional voting, both of which amount in substance to
the same thing. But these devices simply reintroduce in a more
direct and obvious form the very thing that is condemned in those
18 (1915) 130 Minn. 492, 153 N. W. 953.
'19 Orpen v. Watson et al., (1915) 87 N. 3. L. 69, 93 Atl. 853; Farrell v.
Hicken, (1914) 125 Minn. 407, 147 N. W. 815; Adams v. Landon, (1910) 18
Idaho 483, 110 Pac. 280; and see State ex rel. Zent v. Nichols et al., (1908)
50 Wash. 508, 97 Pac. 728. It should be noted, however, that the two cases
last cited involved primary and not general election laws, and it is commonly
recognized that a good deal more leeway is allowed the legislative authorities
in prescribing the methods whereby primaries are t& be conducted than in
regulating the actual election of candidates to office.
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decisions which have held the Hare system unconstitutional,
namely, a limitation of the voter's right to vote for as many candi-
dates as there are officers to be elected and to have his vote for
each candidate counted as equal in all respects to the vote of every
other elector. It therefore appears that, if the Hare system as
outlined in the Wattles case is unconstitutional, for the reasons
stated in that case and in the Elkus case, the objection cannot be
cured by a modification of the system without sacrificing the pri-
mary objective of the Hare system, proportional representation.
There is one ground of the decision in the Wattles case, supra,
which deserves brief mention. The rules for counting votes
under the Hare system in the form in which it was adopted in the
Kalamazoo charter provide that, subject to the rule that as nearly
as possible an equal number of ballots shall be taken from each
precinct, surplus ballots which are transferred "shall be taken
as they happen to come without selection." This introduces an
element of chance into the determination of the result, which the
court found objectionable. It must be conceded that this objec-
tion, as far as it extended, was well taken. It is no answer that,
as a practical matter, the element of chance is so slight as to be
negligible, due to the operation of statistical laws. It might just
as well be said that it would be permissible to introduce a system
whereby only ten or twenty-five or some other per cent less than
all of the ballots cast at an election should be counted, "taken as
they happen to come without selection", and the result of the
election determined thereby. But there is a variation of the Hare
system, known as the "exact method" as opposed to the "chance
method", which eliminates this particular objection. As that
change could be introduced into any proposal for proportional
representation without otherwis6 affecting its efficacy except by
making still more complex the process of counting ballots and
also because the objection just mentioned is not the one princi-
pally relied on by the courts which have declared the Hare system
unconstitutional, it may be dismissed from further consideration.
The authorities in support of the constitutionality of propor-
tional representation will now be considered. The Ohio case of
Reutener ,v. City of Cleveland, supra, upheld the validity of a
charter amendment embodying the Hare system in exactly or
almost exactly the same form that was declared unconstitutional
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by the Michigan and California courts, and the attack upon the
constitutionality of the system in the Reutener case was based on
virtually the same line of argument as that which formed the
ground for the decision in the Elkus case and one of the grounds
for the decision in the Wattles case. It was contended, as in those
cases, that the Hare system violated a clause of the State consti-
tution providing that every person having certain qualifications
should "be entitled to vote at all elections". The court refused to
hold that this constitutional provision rendered the Hare system
invalid as applied in an amendment to the charter of the City of
Cleveland, although it was the Ohio court which, in the Constan-
tine case, supra, first construed the constitutional provision in
question as prohibiting a voting scheme under which the voter
was not allowed to vote for as many candidates as there were
offices to be filled.
Before considering the decision in the Reutener case in detail,
it will be convenient to dispose of the other Ohio case upholding
the Hare system as embodied in the Cleveland charter amend-
ment. In Hile v. City of Cleveland, supra, this amendment was
attacked on various constitutional grounds other than those relied
on in the Reutener case, and other than those made the basis of
the Michigan and California decisions adverse to the Hare sys-
tem. The Hile case is interesting particularly because in it the
proportional representation amendment was complained of as
violating the Constitution of the United States, as well as con-
flicting with certain sections of the constitution and laws of
Ohio. The court disposed of all the objections in rather short
order. A writ of error in the Hile case to the Supreme Court of
the United States was dismissed by that tribunal, without an
opinion, on the ground that there was no substantial federal ques-
tion involved.2 0 It may therefore be concluded that, whatever
may be said in various jurisdictions as to the validity of pro-
portional representation under State constitutions, at all events
a system like the Hare system does not violate any provision of
the Constitution of the United States. As most of the grounds
on which the Cleveland charter amendment was attacked in the
Hile case were not specifically objections to the Hare system as
such, but simply involved the question to what extent the'people
20 Hile v. City of Cleveland (1924) 266 U. S. 582.
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of Cleveland were authorized to adopt a form of government dif-
ferent from that prevailing in other parts of the State, it will not
be necessary for present purposes to examine the Hile case in de-
tail, though some of its language with respect to the rights of
Ohio chartered cities will be referred to hereinafter.
The Reutener case, on the other hand, dealt with the only
ground of objection to proportional representation thus far con-
sidered which might be relied on under the Missouri constitution
and which has carried weight with the courts of other States.
The contention that the Hare system was invalid because it de-
prived the voter of the right to have his vote counted for as many
candidates as there were officers to be selected, was criticized by
the Court in the Reutener case in the following words:
The court does not consider that this contention is estab-
lished upon the facts. The ballot is counted every time that
it is considered as adding one to or subtracting one from a
group of votes. It is true that the vote may become effective
in electing only one candidate, and in this sense possibly it
may be "counted for only one councilman."
However, plaintiff in error can hardly contend that a vot-
ing system which may at times deprive a ballot of its full ef-
fect is necessarily unconstitutional.
That the effect of a vote is often nullified in our elections
is axiomatic. It is a matter of common knowledge that na-
tional officials have been elected by an actual minority. John
Quincy Adams, for instance, received fewer popular votes
than Andrew Jackson in the election of 1824 .... That is
to say, votes of a plurality of electors are not always counted
so as to be effective in national elections. It is also a matter
of common knowledge, that, through the gerrymander, dis-
tricts may be so defined as to be practically deprived of the
effectiveness of their votes in elections, that is, a majority
may be so districted as to become a minority, without power
of electing its candidates.
The vote of an elector, therefore, under our present form
of state and national government may be shorn of its effect so
far as the actual election of the elector's candidate is con-
cerned, without invalidating the method of election.
On the face meaning of this section the Hare System of
Proportional Representation does not violate the Ohio con-
stitution, for the elector is not prevented from voting at any
election. He is entitled to vote at every municipal election,
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even though his vote may be effective in the election of fewer
than the full number of candidates, and he has exactly the
same voting power and right as every other elector.
While all of the foregoing language is encouraging to the ad-
vocates of proportional representation as showing, at least, that
not all courts need be expected to take as unfavorable a view of the
Hare system as the Michigan and California courts have taken,
yet the Reutener case as a whole is not as helpful to the cause of
proportional representation in Missouri as might have been
hoped, because of a further ground of the decision. Although
the majority opinion did criticize the Constantine case, saying
that it "extended the plain language of the constitution far be-
yond the word-meaning of the provision", and that it added to the
clause "shall be entitled to vote at all elections", the words "and
for a candidate for each office to be filled at the election", the
Reutener case did not expressly overrule the Constantine case,
but, on the contrary, weakened the effect of its criticism thereof,
by adding these words:
Moreover, that case was decided before the home-rule
provision of the Ohio constitution was enacted. Since then
a whole new body of law has developed in regard to Ohio
city government-a body of law giving to cities the widest
possible latitude in the formation of their local govern-
mental functions, limited only by provisions of the state
constitution.
To hold valid this system of voting adopted by the people
of Cleveland is merely to carry out the plain meaning of the
constitutional provision that municipalities shall have all
powers of local self-government, and to give effect to the
power which rightly takes precedence over all statutes and
court decisions, the will of the people, as expressed in the
organic law.
It would not be true to say that the sole ground of the decision
in the Reutener case was that Ohio cities of the class to which
Cleveland belongs have such an extraordinary degree of home-
rule that the ordinary provisions of the constitution relating tothe
rights of voters at elections are not applicable to them to the same
extent as such provisions are applicable to other cities in Ohio and
as the constitutional provisions of other States are applicable to
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the municipalities of those States. But there is ample reason to
fear that a Missouri court might reject the Reutener case as a
precedent in passing on any proportional representation system
which might be introduced in a chartered city in Missouri, on the
ground that such cities are not given by the Missouri constitution
the same degree of autonomy as the City of Cleveland was held
to enjoy. In a brief concurring opinion in the Reutener case, one
member of the court took occasion to say that as to other than
chartered municipalities the Constantine case had not been over-
ruled and its principles still applied, and a dissenting opinion,
after stating that the majority opinion did not change the inter-
pretation of the constitution in the Constantine case, that "Each
elector of the district is entitled to vote for a candidate for each
office to be filled at the election", criticized the majority opinion
on the evident assumption that the sole effective ground of that
opinion was that the constitutional provision in question, as in-
terpreted in the Constantine case, was inapplicable to home-rule
cities under the Ohio constitution. The dissenting judge's criti-
cism of the majority opinion, which criticism had some merit,
provided his premises were correct, was that the section of the
constitution conferring self-government on certain municipalities
should not be construed as paramount to the section relating to
the rights of voters, since it was possible to construe these two
sections together so as to give effect to both.
At the time of the decision of the California case of People
ex rel. Devine v. Elkus, supra, the Supreme Court of Ohio had not
yet handed down the decision in the Reutener case, hereinabove
referred to, but the California court which decided the Elkus case
had before it a typewritten copy of the opinion of the Ohio Court
of Appeals in the Reutener case, an opinion not to be found in
any printed report. The conclusions of the Ohio Court of Ap-
peals as to the constitutionality of the Hare system were the same
as those later reached by the Supreme Court of Ohio, which af-
firmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, but the language of
the opinion of the Court of Appeals was, of course, different from
that of the Supreme Court. The California court in the Elkus
case took the view that the decision of the Court of Appeals in
the Reutener case was based solely "on the proposition that the
chartered cities of Ohio are given the right of local self-govern-
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ment in the broadest sense". The California court refused to
follow the Ohio decision on the ground that chartered cities in
California were not endowed with such complete autonomy as
the Ohio cities had. The California constitution authorized a
municipality of the class under consideration to "frame a charter
for its own government, consistent with and subject to this con-
stitution"; and the special power granted by the constitution
to such cities to provide in their charters the manner in which
"and the method by which" their officers should be elected did not,
as the court said, empower such cities to "deny electors the right
to vote" or "abridge the constitutional right of qualified electors
to vote".
If the validity of proportional representation as applied to the
legislative bodies of Missouri cities depends on whether the status
of such municipalities under the State constitution is more closely
analogous to that of Cleveland or to that of the California cities,
it seems most likely that the courts will decide against propor-
tional representation. The provisions of the Ohio constitution
conferring autonomy on chartered municipalities read respec-
tively as follows:
Municipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers
of local self-government and to adopt and enforce within
their limits such local police, sanitary and other similar regu-
lations, as are not in conflict with general laws. 21
Any municipality may frame and adopt or amend a char-
ter for its government and may, subject to the provisions of
section 3 of this article, exercise thereunder all powers of
local self-government. 22
It will be noticed that the only express limitation on the right
of self-government provided for in these sections is the provision
that police, sanitary and similar regulations must be "not in con-
flict with" general laws. Quite different are the provisions of
the Missouri constitution above referred to which explicitly state
that any charter adopted by chartered cities, including the City of
St. Louis, shall be "in harmony with the Constitution and laws of
the State." This language is even more restrictive than the
clause of the California constitution above quoted, in that the
Missouri charters must be in harmony with the laws as well as
21 Art. VIII, Sec. 3. 22 Art. VIII, Sec. 7.
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the constitution of Missouri. In view of this provision a Missouri
court could hardly hold, with respect to a Missouri chartered city,
as the case of Hile v. Cleveland, supra, held with respect to char-
tered cities-in Ohio, that if an amendment to the municipal char-
ter conflicted with general laws relating to elections and the like,
the charter provision would prevail, or that municipalities are
vested with the power to do acts not authorized by the statutes
of the State "so long as those acts come within the domain of local
self-government". If the provision of the Missouri constitution
above quoted is to be given what would seem to be the natural
effect of its words, it will mean that the statutes, even if not the
constitution of Missouri, will have to be amended in order to au-
thorize the adoption of the Hare system in municipal elections.
For the general election laws of this State undoubtedly establish
the plurality system of elections, requiring that the candidate
or candidates having the highest number of votes shall be de-
clared elected. They also provide for the marking of ballots with
a cross for each candidate to be voted for, which provision does
not permit the indication of successive choices required by the
Hare system. In the case of State ex rel. Brown v. MeMillan
et al.,2 3 the Supreme Court of Missouri decided that a municipal
election to fill vacancies in a board of aldermen must be held sub-
ject to the general election laws of the State, such as those intro-
ducing the Australian ballot, and it would seem to follow that a
general election of aldermen would be subject to the statutes
which establish the plurality system of voting and direct how
ballots shall be marked.
It may therefore be concluded that it would require changes in
the legislation of Missouri relating to elections in order to make
it possible for a chartered city to adopt the Hare system in the
election of its board of aldermen or city council. Whether it
would also require an amendment to the constitution depends on
what view our courts would take of the interpretation of such
general constitutional provisions as Article VIII, section 2, au-
thorizing persons having the specified qualifications "to vote at
all elections by the people", section 3 of the same Article, provid-
ing, among other things, that all elections by the people shall be
23 (1891) 108 Mo. 153, 18 S. W. 784.
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by ballot, and Article II, section 9, which provides that "all elec-
tions shall be free and open". None of these provisions by its
express language actually demands an interpretation whereby
the traditional plurality system of voting will be held sacrosanct
and inviolable. But, as has been above pointed out, the courts of
several other states have held that more or less similar consti-
tutional provisions imply at least so much of the conventional
system as will guarantee to every voter the right to cast for each
officer to be elected a vote which will count equally in the result
with every other vote cast by him and with the vote cast by every
other elector.
In support of this proposition may be cited not only the Wattles
(Michigan) and Elkus (California) cases involving the Hare
system, but also the Constantine (Ohio) case on limited voting,
the Maynard (Michigan) case on cumulative voting, and two
concurring opinions, and perhaps dicta in the majority opinion,
in State of North Dakota ex rel. Shaw v. Thompson,24 relating to
cumulative voting. In the last cited case the majority of the court
held that the particular statute under consideration did not pur-
port to authorize cumulative voting, but one judge, while agree-
ing with the majority that the act did not involve cumulative
voting, said that if it did purport to authorize cumulative voting
it was invalid. The following dictum in State v. Wrightson,25
also supports the doctrine of the Constantine case to some extent:
An act of the legislature providing that each qualified
voter of the county should vote for only one of the mem-
bers apportioned to the county, would be plainly uncon-
stitutional.26
The Minnesota case of Brown v. Smalwood,2 7 holding uncon-
stitutional a system of preferential voting not involving minority
representation, might be regarded as tending in the same gen-
eral direction, although there are some important distinctions
between the preferential system there involved and the Hare
system.28
24 (1911) 21 N. D. 426, 131 N. W. 231.
25 Supra, note 17.
26 1. c. 202.
27Supra, note 18.
28 Rathbone v. Wirth, (1896) 150 N. Y. 459,45 N. E. 15, holding unconstitu-
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In the foregoing enumeration no mention has been made of
decisions holding limited voting invalid under constitutional pro-
visions expressly authorizing the qualified elector to vote "in the
election of all officers". Such decisions have been cited elsewhere
in this discussion.
The authorities directly or indirectly in favor of the constitu-
tionality of proportional representation include only the two Ohio
cases on the Hare system, above referred to, and the Pennsylvania
case of Commonwealth ex rel. McCormick v. Reeder,20 upholding
the constitutionality of limited voting. As has already been
pointed out, the Reutener case is weakened as an authority ap-
plicable in Missouri by the fact that the decision rests in part on
the peculiar degree of autonomy granted to chartered cities under
the Ohio constitution. And the opinion in the McCormick case,
while based partly on a refusal to read into the words of the con-
stitution "vote at all elections", the additional words "also for
every candidate of a group of candidates for the same office", was
also in part based on a ground which could not be relied on in
Missouri, to-wit: that the Pennsylvania constitution had long
been construed in practice as not prohibiting limited voting. The
constitution expressly authorized limited voting in certain cases,
and was held by implication to make its adoption in other cases
of the same general character discretionary with the legislature.
The case of People ex rel. Longenecker v. Nelson et al. 30 though
containing a dictum to the effect that a provision for cumulative
voting is not unconstitutional, does not really tend to support
the constitutionality of the Hare system, but insofar as it has
tional a statute involving a form of limited voting, might possibly be cited as
an authority adverse to the Hare system, but is distinguishable in principle.
The principal grounds of the decision against limited voting, as applied in
that case, were (1) that it gave the minority an equal voice with the majority,
and (2) that a constitutional provision for the appointment of city, town and
village officers "by such authorities thereof, as the legislature shall designate"
authorized the legislature to empower the common council as a body to select
a police board, but did not authorize the legislature to delegate to a part of
the common council the exclusive right to vote for a part of the board, since a
part of the council as distinguished from the whole body, was not a city au-
thority. Limited voting by the general public was not involved. The statute
in question was also subject to other objections having no application in the
case of the Hare system.
29 (1895) 171 Pa. St. 505, 33 Atl. 67.
o (1890) 133 Ill. 565, 27 N. E. 217.
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any relevancy to the matter at all, recognizes the rule of the Con-
stantine case in principle, though giving it a different application
from that which was given it in the Maynard case. The cumula-
tive voting provision was upheld because it was not compulsory
for the voter to cumulate his votes, the court saying that, if the
act had made the cumulation of votes compulsory it would have
deprived the voter of the privilege of voting at the election of a
part of the officers to be elected, and would therefore have been
unconstitutional under the principle of the Constantine case.
As the foregoing discussion shows, the authorities on either
side of the question of the constitutionality of the Hare system
are very few, even if to the cases directly passing on that system
are added those involving other voting systems, but turning more
or less on the same questions which have been raised in the cases
involving the Hare system. Each of the cases on either side of
the question involved some features which would distinguish it
from a case involving proportional representation which might
arise under the Missouri constitution. Even if directly in point,
the cases decided in other States would be in no sense binding on
the courts of Missouri. The doctrine of the cases adverse to the
Hare system involves considerable stretching of the language of
the constitutional provisions relied on, but it has in its favor at
least the fact that it has commended itself to a majority of the
courts which have considered the question. For all of these rea-
sons, the Missouri courts might decide either way on the question
of the constitutionality of the Hare system, and would be able to
find some support for their decision, both in precedent and on
principle.
Perhaps some slight hint as to the general attitude the Mis-
souri courts would take on this question can be derived from some
of the language used by the Supreme Court of Missouri in State
ex rel. Brown v. McMillan.31 In discussing, in another connec-
tion, the provision of the Missouri constitution that "all elections
shall be free and open," the court said:
It is not merely the right of every elector to cast his bal-
lot in an open place. It was designed that this vote so cast
should be effective-carry its proper weight in effecting the
result--as the voluntary act of a freeman.
31 Note 23.
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The court then quoted from People v. Hoffman :32
Elections are free when the voters are subjected to no
intimidation or improper influence. Elections are equal
when the vote of every elector is equal, in its influence upon
the result, to the vote of every other elector.
The above passages, of course, were not written by the court
with anything like proportional representation in mind. They
are only in the nature of straws showing in which direction the
wind blows-the general trend of the judicial mind-and it must
be admitted that they do not give much indication of what deci-
sion might be expected in a case involving proportional repre-
sentation. It may be argued with much force that the Hare sys-
tem comes much nearer than the traditional plurality system to-
wards making the vote of every elector equal in its influence and
effectiveness, but language such as that above quoted has more
often been used by the courts in support of the doctrine of the
Constantine case. However, it is to be hoped that, whenever
sufficient popular sentiment shall have been awakened in favor
of proportional representation to induce the State legislature to
enact the statutory changes necessary to put it into effect in Mis-
souri, the courts will see their way clear to decide in favor of the
constitutionality of such legislation, there being nothing in the
Missouri constitution which expressly prohibits it.
32 (1836) 116 I1. 587, 5 N. E. 596, 8 N. E. 788.
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